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Jn a 1980s Canadian conference on ethnicity and war, Harold Troper 
remarked that Canadian hi storiography contained few studies on the sur-
vival of ethnic consciousness during times of war. 1 There are several 
texts on Japanese Canadians during World War IP and some on how 
German and Ukrainian communities survived when wartime hysteria 
threatened the culture of "enemy aliens" in Canada,3 but we have little 
insight into how the world wars affected other immigrant groups. This 
article will discuss ethnic consciousness and Swedish nationalism among 
Swedish immigrants in western Canada during the First and the Second 
World Wars. Swedish-Canadians led a rich cultural life throughout the 
period, and even though a plethora of various organizations suggests a 
l. Mary Halloran, " Ethnicity, I.he Slate and War: Canada and Its Ethnic Minorities, 1939-45," lntema1i-
onal Migration Revieiv 2 1.1 ( 1987), 167. 
2. For example, F. E. La Violette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II: A Social and Psychological 
Account (Toronto, 1948); Ken Adachi, The Enemy Thot Never Was (Toronto, 1976); Barry l3roadfoo1, )'eai:v of 
Sorrow, Years of Shame (Toronto, 1977); and J.L Granalslein el al., Mutual Hostages: Canadian and Japa-
nese During the Second World War (Toronto, 1990). 
3. For examples other than discussed in the text, see Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson, eds., loy-
alties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War (Edmomon, 1983); and T homas M. Prymak, 
Maple Leaf and 7i·ide11r: The Ukrainian Ca11adia11s During the Second World War (Toronto, 1988). 
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division among Swedish immigrants, it also points to a persistent search 
for ethnic belonging.4 Between the First and the Second World War, how-
ever, Swedish Canadians moved from a state of ethnic consciousness to 
ethni c awareness.5 That is , in the 1910s, many Swedish immigrants who 
wrote to newspapers or belonged to Swedish organisations identified 
themselves foremost as Swedes who Jived in Canada. Moreover, they 
developed what James Barrett calls an ethnocultural class formation, 
where they created a working-class culture with distinct ideas and strate-
gies that were based on Old World experiences but adapted to the host 
count:ry.6 During the 1940s, working-class Swedish-Canadians still 
valued their heritage and supported ethnic groups and newspapers, but by 
this time their Canadian identity was as important as their Swedish one, 
and any ethnocultural class formation is difficult to distinguish from 
Canadian working-class strategies. Nationalistic expressions also 
changed between the two wars. During the First World War, Swedes fre-
quently responded to criticism by attacking both Canada's and Britain's 
sense of morality and war strategies. This defiance expressed itself as 
pro-German sympathy, but evidence suggests that it stemmed rather from 
a grievance with conditions in Canada. Such aggressive Swedish nation-
alism was not in evidence in the 1940s when the Swedish community 
identified with the Allies. 
Since the majority of Swedish immigrants settled in the western 
provinces, this study concentrates mainl y on the two largest Swedish set-
tlements, Winnipeg in Manitoba and Vancouver in British Columbia. For 
both provinces the Swedish-Canadian press is an important tool by which 
4. Ljungmark and Akerman suggest that the Swedish Canadian habit of "over organizing" in a great 
variety of clubs and organisations hampered their level or ethnic consciousness by preventing them from 
"concentratlingl on one or two common clhnic manifestations." Ljungmark and Ak...:111ia11, .. T he Unknown 
Emigration - Swedes in Canada 1870-1970," /\rkiv i Nurrla11d 16 (1998), 110. 
5. Ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are slippery subjects to define. James McKay and Frank Lewins 
differ between ethnic awareness and ethnic consciousness. For the former the ethnic trait "is no more mea-
ningful than his or her other ... characteristics, individuals who possess ethnic consciousness have "ethnic 
trait(s) which assumes considerable importance vis-1/-vis other personal characteristics to the extent that 
ethnic identification can be the mode of identification." James McKay and Frank Lcwins, "Ethnicity and the 
Ethnic Group: A Conceptual Analysis and Reformulation," Ethnic w1d Racial Studies 1.4 (October 1978), 
418. 
6. James R. Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the 
Working Class in the United S tales, 1880- J 930," .lm1rnal of America11 Histo1y (December 1992), 999. 
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to determine the viewpoint of Swedi sh immigrants since few documents 
and letters that could provide insight have survived from the First World 
War period. Swedes in British Columbia did not produce a lasting 
Swedish-language newspaper until 1929,7 but judging from letters to 
Svenska Canada Tidningen (SCT) in Winnipeg it was avail able in British 
Columbia in the 1910s.8 Like most Swedish-Canadian publications, SCT 
was largely conservative in its editorial comments. Swedish socialists in 
Canada were never numerous enough or sufficiently organized to 
manage a long-lasting paper,9 but it is clear that they voiced their opinion 
through the Swedish press that existed. That it allowed the publication of 
blatantly socialistic articles and letters from readers reflected the eco-
nomic tightrope on which its survival balanced. 
Most Swedish-Canadian newspapers struggled to stay alive. In 1915, 
Svenska Canada Tidningen pleaded with its readers to pay their subscrip-
tion so that the paper could pay pressing debts.10 In the 1910s, British 
Columbia managed to support a Swedish-language newspaper for only 
one year, and the more successful Svenska Pressen (SP) fought for its 
survival from its inception in 1929.11 After a 1940 subscription drive in 
7. In 1913, 0. L. Sundborg published a Swedish newspaper, Va11co11ver Pos1en, but there are no surviving 
issues in local archives, and it is unclear when it expired. The first issue of Svenska Pressen came out in 1929, 
and this paper is still being published in 200 I. For a history of Swedish newspapers in British Columbia, see 
Matthew Lindfors Ponds [hereafter MLF), "f'cm minuter - Vancouver, B.C.," September 23, 1948, University 
of British Columbia, Special Collection n1ereafter UBC-SC] . 
8. For example, sec SCT, "Fran Castledale, B.C.," Febmary 17, 1915. Swedish publishers went on tours to 
Swedish communities in order to raise subscribers. Jn 1921, the Swedish-language Fonn11 from Manitoba 
visited Silver Hill and Matsqui in British Columbia on a subscription drive. Forum, "En fard i British 
Columbia," March 15, 1921. Clipping kept by Karin Edberg-Lee, Silver Hill, British Columbia. 
9 . Lars Ljungmark notes that Swedes in Manitoba published a few shon-livcd radical papers. These con-
sisted of the weekly farmer-labor publication Forum; Fri/1e1svii11 11e11 that was closely connected with a 
Lutheran minister; und the monthly Frilret thut wus organized by the Scandinavian Workers and Farmers 
League of Canada. Ljungmark and Akerman, "The Unknown Emigration," l 19. Fifty percent of all Swedish 
socialist publications in North America fo lded within a year, and only three Swedish-American socialist 
papers survived more than a decade. Ulf Jonas Bjork, "Swedish Ethnici ty and Labor Socialism in the Work of 
Nils F:son Brown, 1919- 1928," The Historian (Summer 1997), 760. 
l 0. SCT, "Editorial," September 22, 1915. In 1946 the Svenska Canada Tidningen had approximately one 
thousand subscribers while the Norwegian paper Norrona had three thousand subscribers. Both papers were 
for sale that year due to financial d ifficulties. Arthur Anderson to Matthew Lindfors, October 19, 1945, MLF", 
Box 2, UBC-SC. 
l 1. It had continuous drives for subscrihcrs, and in the 1940s the Swedish community put on bingo nights 
in order to raise money. Sture Strang [pseud.J, interview with Eva St. Jean, December 1999. 
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western Canada, its editor, Matthew Lindfors, raged over "how hopeless 
the situation [was] for Swedish newspapers in Canada, [and] how unde-
serving the Swedes lwerel of having someone to work in their interest. " 12 
He attempted to attract new subscribers in 1944 by creating an English-
Janguage newspaper for English-speaking Scandinavians and Finnish 
Canadians. The Scan.din.avian Post, a biweekly publication, lasted just 
over a year, and in the summer of 1945, Scandinavians in British 
Columbia were again left with only one newspaper, Svenska Pressen. 
Considering Swedish newspapers' low subscription rate, it is difficult 
to judge just how important the ethnic press was to Swedish-Canadians 
or how accurately it represented their community. This situation was not 
peculi ar to Swedes in Canada. While noting the imporcance of the ethnic 
press when evaluating the mood of Swedish immigrants, Sture Lindmark 
cautions, "it is impossible to determine to what extent the newspapers did 
reflect the opinion of the entire Swedish-American community." 13 Still, 
the ethnic press allowed immigrant groups to express political and cul-
tural views that would not have been acceptable or re levant in main-
stream newspapers. Ulf Beijbom believes that in the nineteenth century, 
the Swedish American press was "the leading informant on political 
activity" of Swedish immigrants in Chicago. 14 Likewise, a study done on 
modern-day ethnic groups in Canada concludes that although the ethnic 
press plays a complicated role, it "facilitates the political adaptation of a 
large number of new arrivals." 15 In view of the pressing need of Swedish-
Canadian papers to retain as many subscribers as possible, they refl ected 
a wide range of opinions by the Swedish Canadi an community and thus 
12. Matthew Lindfors to Rudolf Manson, December 14, 1940, MLF, Box 2, UBC-SC. Lindfors expressed 
fmstration with readers who borrowed issues from regular subscribers rather than paying for their own, like-
ning it with theft of income that rightfully belonged to the paper. SP, "Ord fr5n prcnumcranter," November20, 
1941. 
13. Sture Lindmark, Swedi.,fr America, 1914-1932: Studies i11 Etlmiciry 111it/1 Hmplwsis 0 11 llli11oi.1· a11d 
Mi111 1e.wta (Uppsala, Sweden, 197 1), 70. 
14. Ulf Beijbom, "The Printed Word in a Nineteenth Century Immigrant Colony: The Role of the Ethnic 
Press in Chicago's Swede Town," Sivedislr Pioneer Historical Q11arter/y 28 (A1iril 1977), 90. 
15. Jerome H. Black and Christian Leithner, "Immigrants and Political Involvement in Canada: The Role 
of the Ethnic Media," Ca11adia11 Ethnic St11die.1/Et11de.1· eth11iq11es au Canada 20. I ( 1988), 17. 
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provide an insight into how a spectrum of Swedish immigrants reacted to 
the pressures of war. 16 
Although both labor historians and contemporary readers consider 
Svenska Canada Tidningen to have been "non-labor" and "bourgeois," 17 
its editor between 19 l 2-1919, Nils F. Brown ( 1886-1960), was a member 
of the Socialist Labor Party. Brown downplayed his socialistic sympa-
thies during the first years of the war, 18 but as Canadian labor grew 
increasingly stronger, Brown became more direct in his political com-
ments.19 In 1919, he overstepped the line and was fired by SCT's owner, 
M. Dahl, a turn which convinced Brown to start the socialistic paper 
Forum.20 It, however, had financial difficulties from the start, and Brown 
did not receive sufficient support from either subscribers or advertisers. 
In desperation, he embezzled money in order to keep the magazine afloat, 
and was only saved from serving jail time when the Swedish community 
in Winnipeg raised money to pay back his creditors.21 
During the war years, however, Nils F. Brown attempted to stay neu-
tral, and noting that the Swedish-Canadian community was divided 
between pro-German and pro-British sympathies, he allowed each camp 
room in Svenska Canada Tidningen.22 Rudolf Einhardt voiced the most 
16. While J have not been able to locate any studies on Swedish-Canadian publications, for insight into the 
Finnish press in Canada, see Varpu Lindstr6m-Bcst and Allen Seager. "Tm•eritar and Finnish Canadian 
Women, 1900- 1930," in The Press of Labor Migrants i11 Ewvpe and North America , 1880.1· 10 1930s, 
(Bremen: Zentraldruckerei dcr Univers itilt Bremen, 1985), 243-264; and Gregory S. Kealey, "The State, the 
Foreign-Language Press, and the Canadian Labor Revolt of 1917- 1920," in Harzig and Hoerdcr ( 1985), 3 11-
348. 
17. One reader expressed his gratitude that the paper, "which one considers conservative"' [trans.I allowed 
social ist opinions. SCT, February 14, 19 17. Por further comments on the poli tical sway of the Swedish-Cana-
d ian press, see Eva SI. Jean. '"The Myth of the Big Swede Logger: An Arbe1skarl in the Vancouver Is land 
Forests, 1920- 1948" (unpublished MA thesis, University of Victoria, 1999), 90-93. See also Bjork. "Swedish 
Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F. Brown, 19 19-1928," 762. 
18. For instance , in 1915 Brown s uppol'led the Liberal Party, asking all Swedes, including social demo-
crats, "to do honour to the Swedish name and sland behind the Liberal party program" [trans.]. SCT, 
"Afgangsbetyg ~t Roblinregeringen," August 4, 191 5. 
19. In the most comprehensive study thus fa r of Swedes in Canada, Lars Ljungmark concluded that the 
political involvement of Swedes in Winnipeg was nearly non-existing. Lars Ljungmark. "Swedes in Winnipeg 
up to 1940s. Inter-Ethnic Relations," in S1vedi.1·h Ufe in American Cities, ed. Dag Blanck and Harald Runblom 
(Uppsala: Center of Multiethnic Research, 199 1), 7 1. 
20. Ljungmark and Akerman, "The Unknown Emigration," 119. 
2 1.13j6rk, "Swedish Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F. Brown, 19 19-1928," 764-766. 
22. SCT, "I skott linjen," May 12, 1915. 
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blatantly pro-German sentiment in a series of articles written in Swedish 
for the paper.23 Although Brown cautioned that the newspaper did not 
always share Einhardt's opinions,24 his were only a stronger version of 
those offered by readers who frequently expressed their agreement with 
his viewpoints.25 Einhardt was a confirmed socialist and a regular con-e-
spondent for SCTfrom 1916.26 He reminded Swedish-Canadian socialists 
that Germany was the birthplace of socialism, and combined his defense 
with a critique of England, which he considered exploitative and imperi-
alistic. As an example of British oppression he mentioned their involve-
ment in South Africa where "all the bullying, all the insolence, all the 
lies, like one link precedes another led to the Boer war." As for Canada, 
he w·ged the readers to: 
look at the 'patriotic' interjections that the populace utters in this country .... Does this 
idiotic mob really believe that it can drive the Germans out of France by for instance 
forcing Henri Bourassa to wave the Union Jack in Montreal? ... To be able to keep up 
this eagerness for war they have been forced to 'paint the devi l on the wall ' by empha-
sizing the 'German danger' as opposed to the blessings from the English c ivilization , 
and a whole lot of other more or less ridiculous blathering.27 
In a later SCT issue, Einhardt referred to British "imperialists," sug-
gesting that "an instinct towards privatizing" stood behind B1itish colo-
nization. He ended with the warning, "what is happening to Germany 
today could happen to us tomorrow."28 
23. Rudolf Einhardt was born in Sk5ne and completed a degree in history at Lund University in 1896. He 
immigrated to Canada in 1906 where he selllcd in Saskatchewan. SCT, "Farmare och Filosof," April 26, 19 16. 
After Nils F:son Brown left Canada in d isgrace, Einhardt becmne the editor of Fornm until its demise in 1924. 
Michael Brook, " Radical Literature in Swedish-America: A Narrative Smvey," in Essays 011 1/re Sca11di-
11avia11-Nor1/r America11 Radical Press 1880s-/930s, Dirk Hoerder, ed. (Bremen: Zentraldruckerei dcr Univer-
sitat Bremen, 1984), 49; and Bjork, "Swedish Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F:son Brown, 
l 919- 19?8," 766. 
24. In "Farmare och Filosof," Brown notes that it has been with deep regret that he has refused to publish 
some of Einhardt's "more dangerous" articles about the war. SCT. April 26, 1916. See also, "Ell svar till 
RudolfEinhardt,'' April 18, 19 17, and postscript note in "Ordel ilr fr ill," July 21, 1915. 
25. Open admiration for Einhardt was al times accompanied by a pica for restraint. Signature Helmer 
Johnson feared Einhardt's polemic would "induce a storm of d islike and hatred" over Swedish Canadians. 
SCT, "'Tiii Mr. Rudolf Einhardt," August 11, 19 15. 
26. Einbardt's first full-length article was "Socialismen och kriget," April 26, 1916. 
27. SCT. Feb 21, 19 17. All translations from Swedish are my own and are marked as [trans.] in the foot-
note. Other quotes were originally written in English. 
28. "Situationen just nu," [trans.] SCT. March 24, 19 17. 
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The blend of socialistic rhetoric and pro-German sentiment is an 
apparent contradiction, but other Swedish writers on the political left 
were strongly critical of Britain and the British. Olof S. Nelson defended 
Rudolf Einhardt and thanked him for his "valuable contributions."29 
Nelson also mixed anti-British sentiment with a socialistic vocabulary, 
reserving particular contempt for the Conservative Party led by Robert 
Borden. He cited economic and political agreements between Canada 
and Britain, and argued that these stifled Canada's independence. Nelson 
likened Canada's domestic autonomy to a smokescreen that "flattered the 
vanity of the imperialistic mob" in order to allow financing of the British 
war debt. He compared the Liberal and the Conservative parties with 
"rotten apples" but maintained , "despite all their faults and wants the lib-
erals [were Canada's] only hope." The Liberal Party thus was the lesser 
of two evils, and he most certainly connected the conservative govern-
ment with "reactionary" and "imperialistic" forces in Britain.30 
Svenska Canada Tidningen 's critique of the Canadian government 
sometimes bo1rnwed language from anti-German propaganda, although 
the paper directed its derogatory remarks towards Canada. In "Incident of 
Canadian Prussianism" it charged that a recent Swedish immigrant, Fritz 
Kilman, was unfairly accused and imprisoned for pro-German sympa-
thies. 31 Shortly after joining the 38111 Battalion in 1914, a "drunken" army 
doctor "forcefully" injected him with an unnamed substance, which left 
Kilman partly paralyzed. Three weeks later, he was mTested without 
explanation, interned , and informed that he was under suspicion of being 
a German spy. He was only rescued from this "barbaric treatment" after 
spending six months in internment and following intervention from the 
Swedish and Danish consulates. The critique against Canada was partic-
ul arly strong in this article , perhaps because a Swedish immigrant - and 
29. "Ar Canada ett lydrike?" SCT, April 4, 19 17 [trans .] . 
30. Another writer in the same issue railed against the Conservative government's warmongering, char-
ging that together wilh church institutions and a biased press, it persecuted pacifists. " If only the canons are 
fed, the people may starve, and sowing and cultivating of the [farmers'] fields gain lesser importance" [trans.]. 
Thus, th is writer tied together several socia l i~tic philosophies, such as pacifism and anti-religion, using it as a 
cri tique of the Canadian government. SCT, "N~gra rcfl cktioner," April 4 , 19 17. 
31. The article was subtitled: "Swedish soldier who wished to fight for 'king and coun11y' brutalised: 
Victim of spy hysteria" [trans.] See, "Utslag af canadensiskt prusscri. Svensk soldat som ville kampa for 
'kung och land ', brutaliseras. Spionskriickens offer," SCT, March 28, 19 17. 
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with him the entire Swedish community - was directly threatened, and 
SCT added emphasis by dressing the censure in the customary language 
of anti-German propaganda. The anti-British sentiment expressed by 
Swedish-Canadian socialists was, however, at variance with both Cana-
dian and Swedish contemporary socialistic organizations. 
Although North-American socialists also were pacifists, they mostly 
avoided siding with either Germany or Britain, claiming instead that all 
wars were based on capitalistic greed that transcended national bar:riers.32 
Martin Robin notes that even militant socialists in Canada refused to take 
sides, arguing, "it was a matter of indifference which side won."33 Like-
wise, Swedish anti-war spokesmen in the United States suggested that 
wars fed industrialists while the masses paid the price, but there are no 
signs of the vehement di slike of the domestic and British governments 
that we see in Canada. 34 
The Swedish-Canadian reaction on the left was thus distinct from that 
of Anglo-Canadian socialists, and it also contradicted political lines in 
Sweden.35 From the mid-1 800s, the fear of a possible Russian invasion 
combined with ideological affinity drew Sweden closer to Germany, but 
towards the end of the century, the Swedish political left rejected pan-
Germanism. By the time of the First World War, liberals and socialists 
were strongly pro-British while the Conservative Party, the mili tary elite 
and Swedish Royalty were vehemently pro-Gennan.36 Socialists in 
32. See for instance an anti-conscrip tion meeting that was held by the Socialis t Pa1t y of Cmiada in Van-
couver. The speaker, Jack Kavanaugh, insisted that they were "neither anti-British or anti-German ... [but] 
anti-capitalist." Vc111co11ver S1111, "Socialist 'Antis' Met Behi nd Locked Doors in Theatre," July 12, 19 17. 
33. Martin Robin. "Registration, Conscription, and Independent Labor Politics. 19 16- 19 I 7," in Co11scrip-
1io11 1917, A. M. Willms cl al. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1969), 61. 
34. See Dag Blanck, "Swedish Americans and the 19 18 Gubernatorial Campaign in Minnesota," in 
Swedes in the Twin Ci1ics: /111111igran1 Life and Urban Fronlier, eds. Philip J . Anderson und Dag Blanck (Min-
nesota Historical Society Press, 2001) 317-330. 
35. Sturc Lindmark suggests that Swedish-American sympathy for Gcm1any g rew from a religious and 
nationalistic perspective; as Martin Luther 's homeland, it was strongly defended by the Swedish-American 
Lutheran Church. Lind mark 7 I. Swedish-Americans also differed from Swedish-Canadian immigrants by, as 
Lindmark maintains, "affirming their loyally lo the United S tates" when war became unavoidable. Lindmark 
77. Note, however, that the S1•e11ska Canada Tid11i11ge11 believed that most Swedish Americans detested Presi-
dent Wi lson, and despi te the care ful wording in Swedish-American newspapers, "were more German than 
they were Swedish and American" [trans.J SCT, "Ett svar till Rudolf Einhardt," April 18. 19 I 7. 
36. Lars-Ame Norborg, Sverige.1· historia 1111der 1800- och 1900-wle11. Sve11sk .w111htil/wtveck/i11g 1809-
1992 (Stockholm: Alm4vist & Wiksell , 1993), 25 1-259. 
62 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 34, 2002 
Sweden were clearly aware of the Swedish-Canadian stand, and gently 
reproached their brethren by explaining the Swedish left's pro-British 
position. In a letter to the editor, their spokesperson maintained that sup-
porting Britain was a question of democracy and fairness, pointing out 
that the Swedish right wing's defense of Germany only confinned that 
the Swedish left had chosen correctly. 37 Thus, Swedish-Canadian social-
ists differed from Anglo-Canadian, Swedish-American and Swedish 
socialists by conducting a strong anti-British and pro-German campaign. 
Although Svenska Canada Tidningen was vigilant about evidence of 
official discrimination against Swedes in Canada, the Canadian govern-
ment only considered Swedes a marginal threat. 38 When Canada censored 
an imported Swedish journal, Svenska Canada Tidningen claimed the 
censorship was unjustified, and noted that possession of the journal was 
punishable with a fine of $5,000.00 and up to five years in jail.39 T he 
paper admitted, however, that Canadian censorship was lax in compar-
ison with that in the United States . It noted that foreign and Anglo-Cana-
dian publications were under similar strict conditions, while French 
Canadian newspapers were allowed "to sing its heartfelt opinions even in 
war questions." Accordingly, the situation was worse in the United States 
where even foreign newspapers that "shout[ed] themselves hoarse" with 
American loyalist sentiment were muffled by "Prussianism" executed by 
a "Wilsonian reign of terror."40 Although the Canadian government cen-
sored several foreign language papers in 1918, it allowed the Canadian-
37. SCT, "Fran Vas1manland, Sverige," February 14, 1917. 
38. The Canadian press seemed unconcerned about Swedish immigrants. Even Agnes Lam, whose articles 
regarding German Canadians skirted on fear-mongering, ignored Swedish immigrants. See for example, 
"German Ploning in America To-day," Maclea11'.1· October 19 17. 20-21 and 67; and ' 'The Treason of German-
Amcrican Ncwspupcrs," Maclean's, September 19 17, 56 57. The Family Herald, on lhe other hand, wanictl 
that Swedes in Canada might present a danger should Sweden decide to join forces wi th Germany. Moreover. 
in a far-fetched flight of fantasy the paper insinuated !hat Sweden might invade Canada since the Swedish 
royal line originated from Marshall Bonaparte, a l'rcnch officer in Napoleon's army, who allegedly suggested 
an anack on British North America in order to d istract Britain. Family Herald, "Wi ll Sweden Plunge into 
Vortex of War?" October J 0, 1917. 
39. SCT, "Forbjudcn svcnsk tidskrift," November 14, 1918. 
40. This is another example where the editor used anli-Gcrman vocabulary to describe the Entente and its 
allies. SCT, "Varre an i Canada," October I 0, 19 17 [trans.]. For a closer description of American repression of 
the foreign press, see Lindmark, Swedish America, 1914-1932; and James R. Mock, Ce11sursltip 1917 (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1972). 
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published Swedish press to continue printing in the Swedish language.41 
Thus, although somewhat restricted, Svenska Canada Tidningen ad-
mitted that it was not under any greater censorship than was the main-
stream Canadian press. 
A couple of incidents in Halifax in the fall of 1917 were more serious. 
Swedish diplomatic mail was censored when the Swedish steamship, 
Stockholm, was kept under guard between February 18 and March 12, 
1917 .42 Moreover, in the same period SCT complained bitterly that the 
Canadian government had confiscated regular Swedish mail , an incident 
that the correspondent believed occurred regularly. The paper alleged that 
Swedish mail was scrutini zed more closely than mail from Norwegian 
residents and at times confiscated without a word of explanation or 
apology.43 This incident occurred before "the Luxburg Affair" became 
public knowledge, 44 which might explain the self-righteous outrage on 
part of the Swedish-Canadian press; on the other hand, Britai n had been 
aware of Sweden's previous act of diplomatic indiscretion since 1916, 
which explains its vigilance. 
The Swedi sh press was mistaken, however, when it concluded that 
Swedish correspondence was treated differently from other mail. 
According to the 1916 and 1917 Neutral Censorship Acts, Canada cen-
sored mail to the United States and to tw enty-fo ur other neutral countries. 
For instance, during one month Canadian officials examined 183 pounds 
of mail to Sweden, 238 pounds to Nor way, and 2,536 pounds of mail 
41. Among others, the Finnish language was outlawed in print. Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Cen-
sorship During Canada'.< Grear War (Edmonton: The Unive1·sity of Alberta Press, 1996), 67. 
42. SCT, "Stockholm i filngcnskap i Halifax," April 7, 19 17. The censure of Swedish d iplomatic mail was 
in d irect violation of the 19 17 Neutral Ce nsorship regulation that exempted correspondence from d iplomatic 
representatives o f neutral countries. Due to the Lux burg a ffair, however, Britain had strong reasons to suspecl 
Swedish mail. Allnn I.. Srcinhart , Civil Censorship in Ccuwda During World H~1r I (Toronto: the Unitrnde 
Press, 1986), 24. 
43. SCT, "Svensk post beslagtagen i Halifax," March 2 1, 191 7. 
44. The "Luxhurg Affair" refers to an incident where a German diplomat, Count Karl von Lux burg . used 
the Swedish Ministiy of Foreign Affairs to transmit sensitive data fro m Argentina lo Germany. Steven Koblik 
mai111ains that the Bri tish government refrained from making the affair public knowledge for nearly a year in 
order to time the release of the scandal with a Swedish e lection. The disclosure was intended to inj ure the 
Conservative pro-German Swedish government and ensure an election victory by the Swedish left. Steven 
Koblik, "Warlime Diplomacy and the Democratization of Sweden in September - October 191 7," Jouma/ of 
Modem Nisto1y 4 1 (March J 969), 35. The SCT was cautious after the incident became public, expressing 
hope that Sweden would soon be cleared o f wrongdoing. SCT, "Pi'1 tic anklagadcs bank," Seplc mber 12, 19 17. 
,--
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addressed to Japan.45 If the weight of the mail indicated quantity, 
Swedish correspondences were scrutinized less closely than were those 
addressed to other Scandinavian countries and not nearly as closely as 
mail to Asia. 
All in all, the Canadian government's concern that Swedes might con-
stitute a security risk seems minimal. Letters and memos that circulated 
in the Department of Immigration during the First World War suggest 
that any occasional distrust of Swedish immigrants were manifestations 
of xenophobia among individual officials rather than governmental 
policy. The Canadian government had attempted to increase Scandina-
vian immigration prior to 1914,46 but as the fi ghting dragged on and 
public tension increased officials became more wary of Swedish immi-
gration. In 1916, Bruce Walker, the Commissioner oflmmigration, noted 
that he wished Scandinavians would encourage their relatives and fri ends 
to emigrate, but he conceded that the war years were "not the most pru-
dent moment to conunence an effort."47 Other officers were less positive 
about Swedish immigration, and four months later the Superintendent of 
Immigration, W. D. Scott, found it necessary to issue a memo denying 
that the department had "issued any circular or letter prohibiting the entry 
of Swedes" into Canada. He noted, however, "it was considered advis-
able not to make any specific relaxation of [the wartime immigration 
code] in favor of Swedes:" 
It has been reported by many who are in a position to know, that the Swedish people are 
very sympathetic towards Germany. This, of course, is their own business and we are 
not interlering with them or bringing any pressure to change their sentiments in this 
regard. It would, however, be unwise on our part., knowing what we do, to make a spe-
cial concession to these people .. . 
45. Steinhart 7 and 45-46. ln 1921 , there were 27,700 Swedish born in Canada compared to 23.127 Nor-
wegians an<l 11,650 Japanese Canadians. This indicates 1ha1 1h1~ c1~n.~ors scrntini1.ecl Norwegian and Japanese 
mail more closely than Swedish mail. Census of Canada, 1921, Population, Table 7, "Numerical distribution 
of the immigrant population by birthplace, sex and year of arrival in Canada, by provinces, 192 1." 
46. In 19 I 3 and 19 14 offi cials demanded increased funds in order to encourage prospective Scandinavian 
immigrants more aggressively. Sec for instance W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, to J. Bruce 
Walker, Commissioner of Tmmigration, Manitoba, Dec 22, 19 13, Department of Immigration Records (here-
after Dlmm), B-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (3), British Columbia Archives (hereafter BCA); and W. D. Scott, Super-
intendent of Immigration, to W. G. Annable, General Passenger Agent, C.P.R., July 29, 1914, Dl mm, B-7 15. 
Vol. 13, l'ilc 77 (3), BCA. 
47. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration, to W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, Nov. 28, 
19 16, Dfmm, B-7 15, Vol. 13, File 77 (3), BC/\. 
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Tf, however, a Swede was coming in to engage in any other occupation than farming, 
the concession could not be made on the border, but would have to be made here, and 
as a matter of policy, is not being made at the present time.48 
Clearly, some immigration officials were unsure about whether or not to 
allow Swedes entry into Canada, and a tightening of policy is also clear 
in the stricter restriction on occupation: Swedes were welcome only as 
farmers and agricultural workers.49 
Swedes were never malb·eated in Canada during the First World War 
despite their perceived pro-German predilection. Fritz Kilman 's unfortu-
nate experience was an exception.50 In comparison, Anglo-Canadian hos-
tility, indiscriminate firings from work places,51 and the threat of intern-
ment forced the German community in Winnipeg into a defensive-sub-
missive position where it curtailed club activities and concealed its 
national identity.52 Likewise, despite the long history of German-Cana-
dians in Nova Scotia, many of these pretended to be of Dutch origin .53 
While Newfoundland did not join Canada until 1949, it identified closely 
with Britain and Canada and interned and deported aliens, particularly 
those of German extraction.54 Hence, although Getmans, Ukrainians and 
other "enemy aliens" rightly feared internment and limitation of their 
civil rights, Swedes were never seriously restricted in Canada. 
The Swedish community, however, perceived itself to be under attack, 
48. W. D. Scoll, Superintendent of Immigration, to Percy Reid, Acting Commissioner of lmmigrution, 
March 22, 19 17, Dlmm, B-7 15, Vol. 13, Fi le 77 (3), BCA. 
49. This selected de.5ire for only "bona fide agriculturists" also included other Scandinavians. Unsigned 
letter to J. N. K. Macaliscer, Asst. Commissioner, Departme nt of Colonizacion and Dcvelopmenc, C.1nadian 
Pacific Railway Company, March 29, 1928, DTmm, 13-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (6), BCA. 
50. A tocal of 7,762 residents of Canada were incerned bccween 1914 and 191 9. Of those. 5,954 were 
Auscro-Hungarians and I, 192 Germans. John Herd Thompson, Ethnic Minorities During Tll'o World Wars 
(Ollawa: Canadian Historical Association, 199 1 ), 7 . See also Bill Waiser, Park Prisoners: 711c U111uld S to1y of 
Western Canada'.< National Parks, 1915-1946 (Calgary: Fifth House Publishers, 1995), 6-14. 
51. The Universicy of Toronto fired three German-born professors, and miners in Fernie, Brit ish 
Columbia, struck to procesc working alongside Germans. Thompson 6. 
52. Art Grenke, "The German Communicy of Winnipeg and che English-Canadian Response co World War 
I," Canadian Ethnic Swdies 20.1 ( 1988), 25 and 28-29. 
53. ror instance, warcimc hysteria caused the citizens of Berlin, Oncario, to change ics name co Kicchcner. 
Alvin Finkel and Margarec Conrad, Histmy of the Canadian Peoples: lli67 to the Present (Toronco: Copp 
Clark Ltd., 1998), 2 10-212. 
54. Gerhard P. Bassler, "The Enemy Alien Experience in Newfoundland 1914-19 18," Canodia11 Ethnic 
Studies 20.3 ( 1988), 42-62. 
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which may have increased its nationalistic fervor. Some historians sug-
gest that ethnic groups under pressure in a dominant society develop 
stronger ethnic roots. Art Grenke notes that the hostility towards the 
German community in Winnipeg increased its sense of loyalty towards 
Germany.55 The reverse was also the case since groups who were seen as 
"Canadian" lost their sense of ethnic consciousness. In a historiographic 
review article, J.M. Bumsted remarks that Lebanese immigrants on 
Prince Edward Island and Jews in Newfoundland lost their sense of dis-
tinctiveness because of the acceptance they received from the sur-
rounding community.56 Thus, the retention of ethnic consciousness is not 
simply an internal choice but also depends on external forces, such as the 
degree to which the dominant society accepts the ethnic group. While 
there is no strong evidence suggesting that Canada seriously considered 
Swedish immigrants as a danger to Canada's peace and safety during the 
First World War, there are, however, signs that Swedish-Canadians expe-
rienced social discrimination. 
Swedes responded swiftly and aggressively when English readers 
accused them of disloyalty, but rejoinders often swung away from the 
war and focused on perceived discrimination in other areas.57 In British 
Columbia, a woman remembers the anger and humiliation in the Swedish 
settlement of Silver Hill when a school inspector asked, "Don' t you have 
any white children here? Are they all Swedes?"58 Likewise, when The 
Family Herald printed an anti-Swedish letter from an anonymous writer 
in British Columbia, it received a swift rebuttal in SCT. The writer ranked 
Swedes "as the most objectionable Alien, for he truly hates the Briton, 
while living in snug comfort in our midst," and urged Canadians to "start 
in earnest right now, to make Canada ... a country where everything must 
be British."59 One respondent maintained that: 
55. Grenke, "The German Community of Winnipeg," 30. 
56. J.M. Bumsted, "Ethnic Studies in Atlantic Canada: Or, Some Ethnics arc More Ethnic than Others," 
Acadie11sis (Fall 1989), 198-20 l. 
57. For instance, when the signature "Mrs. Auleen" criticized Swedish immigrants the paper received such 
an indignant response from the readers that it declared twice that the discussion must come to an end. SCT, 
"Ordet ar fritt," March 7, 19 17. 
58. Note, however, that just as the school inspector's equalisation of "British" and "white" was discrimi-
natory so does the humiliation in the Swedish community suggest its racist beliefs. Interview with Emma 
Wennergren [pseud.], Silver Hill, British Columbia, December 1999. 
59. The letter was reprinted in SCT, April l l, l 917. 
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Swedish workers in Canada have the best grounds for loathing the Engl ish. Putting 
a~ide all talk about the war, Swedes still have their reasons. The English bullying and 
conceit, by which they act as if they were superior to the Swedish race, has a bad influ-
ence on the Swedes. And the recurring declaration that Britons are the only white 
people can only be met with scorn. On the other hand, the Engli sh io Canada hate the 
Swedes, because the words 'I am a Swede' are passwords for employment, and the 
English do not, of course, enjoy being turned down whco a Swede is hired.60 
Sjogren did not seem particularly upset by accusations of disloyalty, but 
concentrated instead on rectifyng British-Canadian attitudes toward 
Swedish immigrants. The writer relied on the Swedish reputation for 
being "good workers" which he felt contrasted against a British unrelia-
bility. Certainly Sjogren reacted against a perceived di scrimination that 
he considered both insulting and unfair. As for the war, he admitted that 
Swedes objected to Canada's participation in the war, and praised the 
Swedish-Canadian press "for its position in these bitter times, when one 
runs the risk of being labelled ' traitor' if one holds other views than those 
prescribed by Canada's leading heroes". 
In another instance, Nils F. Brown threatened that discrimination in the 
work place might lead to insurrection if Swedes and other foreigners used 
the war as an excuse to turn against E ngli sh-Canadians. According to 
SCT, the Evening Tribune - which "always has been openly xenophobic" 
- printed a highly derogatory letter from a reader who advocated segre-
gating British and "foreign" workers. The signatLu-e "One of the boys" 
noted that many unemployed Britons were forced to seek work in lumber 
camps and sewer construction, but that they: 
detestred] the idea of having, perhaps, to be mixed with so much foreign element. ... l 
suggest when making up gangs, or squads, to keep al l Britishers f sic] by themselves ... . 
It is only when a man has good surroundings that you get the best results. And I have no 
doubt that it would prove whether or not that Britishers [sic] stand in a c lass by thcm-
selves61 
This writer voiced several corrunon concerns and prejudices among 
Anglo-Canadians. Not only did be resent having to work alongside 
people he distrusted and felt alienated from, but he also reacted against an 
60. SCT March 28, l 9 17 l trans.]. 
61. Reprinted in SCT, "Friim lingshat," January 27, 19 15. 
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implied accusation that Britons were Jess efficient workers than other 
immigrants. 
Nil s F. Brown's acrimonious response attacked both the writer and the 
Canadian government. Brown dismissed "One of the boys" as "a naITow-
minded person with an educational level well below that of Swedes or 
Norwegians," but agreed that any Englishman would hesitate to work 
besirle a "hig strong Swede" since it was obvious that the Briton would 
lose against such competition. He suggested, however, that the Canadian 
government should have made clear in pamphlets that " lure emigrants" to 
the country that Anglo-Canadians discriminated against non-British 
immigrants. According to Brown, Swedes were neither used to nor 
deserved contempt and if Canadian attitudes were better known in 
Sweden it would have a negative impact on Swedish immigration to 
Canada. He ended by the warning that "it may be dangerous in these 
times to show contempt since many immigrants who side with Germany 
might turn against the English. "62 The force of Brown's reply suggested 
that the criticism stung, and his suggestions to the Canadian government 
contained veiled threats. Unless discrimination against immigrants 
ceased, Canada might not only lose its future supply of Swedish workers, 
but Swedish Canadians and other immigrants who favored the Central 
Powers might engage in an active revolt against Anglo Canadians. 
Nonetheless, not all Swedes resented Canada or disagreed with the 
war effort. Scandinavians in Canada even created their own battalion. The 
first attempt, the l 971h Battalion, "the Vikings," received little support 
from the Scandinavian community, allegedly because of a distrust of its 
high command, and was dissolved by January 1917. 63 The second attempt 
was more successful. In March 1916, Scandinavians in Western Canada 
organized the 223'd Overseas Battalion (Canadian Scandinavian) in the 
hope that they would prove themselves worthy of Canada. The formation 
of a special ethnic unit was by no means unusual. In 1915, the Minister , 
of Militia, Sam Hughes, announced that anyone could form a battalion in ' 
Canada.64 By 1917, the Vancouver Sun listed seventeen battalions in 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ser, "Canadas skamlinaver och krigcl," March 7. 1917. 
64. As a result Canada was deluged with not only ethnic battalions but also with those who ca1ercd 10 
miscellaneous oddities, such as unusually short soldiers or prohibilionisls. Desmond Morton, A Military 
His t01y of Canada (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), 136. 
--
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Vancouver that each had recruited numbers ranging from 257 to 1914 
men, bringing the total to nearly 32,000; the Scandinavian Battalion, how-
ever, was too insignificant to merit mention and was lumped with other 
miscellaneous smaller units.65 While the recruiting campaign for the 223n1 
was fairly successful in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, collecting between 
700 - 800 Scandinavian soldiers for overseas fighting, it slowed down 
further west. To con-ect this trend, in the fall of 1916 the Battalion con-
ducted a recruiting campaign in Vancouver that detailed the style of the 
uniform and stressed the Viking heritage.66 More important, promotional 
write-ups urged Scandinavians to seize the chance to prove that they were 
not pro-German.67 The success rate is questionable, however, and in 
February 1917 the commanding officer, H.M. Hannesson, wrote an open 
letter to Scandinavians in western Canada pleading for recruits since 
Scandinavians did not sign up in the hoped for numbers.68 
While the Scandinavian Battalion embodied four nationalities, Swedes 
seemed particularly reluctant to enlist.69 Svenska Canada Tidningen com-
plained that it was a disgrace that so few Swedes were promoted to be 
officers. Not until February 1917 was the first Swede promoted, fo llowed 
by two more a month later.70 Since Swedes constituted the largest group 
among Scandinavians in Canada, the lack of Swedish officers points to a 
severe under-representation of Swedes in the Scandinavian Battalion.71 
65. lltmco11ver S1111 , "Vancouver sends 32,000 men to front since war started," July 18, I 9 I 7. 
66. For instance, the shield on the hat depicted a Norse Viking. Ca11ada Ska11di11ave11 , "Den Candinavisk-
Skandinaviske Bataljon," October 3 I . I 9 16. 
67. Canada Ska11di11nve11, "Skandinaverne s kal tr:ekke i khak i," Ociober 3 I , 19 I 6. 
68. Ser, "Oppel bref till skandinaverna i vastra Canada," February 14, 19 I 7. In I 9 I 6, one recrui ting agent 
spoke in dismay of the many sons of Swedish farmers who hid from sight in order to avoid cnliMment. SCT, 
"Fri\n min rekryte rinsarbete fiir 223"1 Scandinavian Overseas Ballalion," April 26, I 9 I 6. 
69. As a comparison, Icelandic men enlisted in equal numbers as "any national group" and "Icelandic 
women joinP.d in the frenzy of knitting, bandage-mak ing, and fund -rais ing." John I lcrd T hompson, 111e Har-
vests of War: Tile Prairie West, 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), 82. As a whole. immi-
grnnts were over-represented in the Canadian army, many of whom were Bri tish born. While 77 percent of 
Canada's population in I 9 I l was nati ve born, only 47 percent of overseas soldiers were born in Canada. Des-
mond Morton, When your Nw11/Jer 's Up: The Ca11adia11 Soldier i11 the First World War (Toronto: Random 
House, 1993), 278. 
70. Ser, "Den forste svcnskcn," February 2 I, 19 I 7. and "Tv<i nya svenska officcrare," March 7, I 9 I 7. 
71. Jn 1921, there were 27,700 Swedish born in Canada compared to 23, 127 Norwegians, 7. 192 Danes, 
and 776 Icelanders. Although strictly speaking Fi nland does not belong to Scandinavia, Canada had 12,156 
Finnish born immigrants. Census of Canada, 1921, Population, Table 7, "Numerical distribution of the immi-
grant population by birthplace, sex and year of <llTival in Canada, by provinces, I 92 I." 
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Swedes in British Columbia certainly did not flock to the Canadian 
Army. The editor of Svenska Pressen in Vancouver, Matthew Lindfors, 
noted that World War I completely "disorganized" Swedes in B.C., with 
only a few volunteering to fight for their adopted country. The majority 
left the cities and "dispersed like chaff before the wind" to avoid the 
draft. Lindfors maintains that this Swedish escape was significant enough 
to cause the depopulation and even demise of some Swedish organiza-
tions in British Columbia.72 This was in contrast to the absolutely reverse 
reaction of the British population in B.C. Historian Jean Bannan argues 
that Britain's declaration of war against Germany fundamentally altered 
all aspects of life in British Columbia since its residents contributed to 
the war effort in such numbers that the social and economic structures of 
some small communities were irrevocably weakened.73 
Since they did not publish their own newspaper and few Swedi sh 
records remain from the First World War period in British Columbia, it is 
difficult to establish the magnitude of the Swedish resistance.74 Inter-
views with children of early Swedish immigrants suggest that it was a 
political and moral choice, where those who had left Sweden in protest 
against its universal military training also refused to enlist in Canada. For 
instance, the Swedes in Silver Hill , British Columbia, were pacifists and 
socialists who abhorred war, considering it only to benefit capitalists.75 
In some families, where the immigrant generation belonged to thi s first 
wave of Swedish socialism, the dedication to pacifism created tension 
when Canadian-born sons wished to enlist during the Second World 
72. MLF, "Radio Rapport den 15 april 1948," UBC-SP, and MLF, "Svenskt i British Columbia," 1938, 
UBC-SP. 
73. Jean Barman, The We.1·1 Beyond the West: A Histmy of British Co/11111hin (Toronto, 1996). 
74. T he minute books of the Swedish International Order of Good Te rnplars, the Linnea Lodge in Van-
couver, is in one of the rare records from this period. These, however, do not mention the war but concentrate 
on the membership's adherence to the LO.G.T. regulations. See, International Order of Good Temp Jars, Lodge 
Linnea No.76 fonds, "Minute Books 19 12- 1916," UTIC-SC. 
75. The original families in this community left Sweden after the Great Strike and lockout of 1909. Many 
of the men had been blacklisted as "agitators" in Sweden and belonged to the first-wave Swedish socialists. 
Interview with Emma Wennergren [pseutl.], Silver Hill, British Columbia, Dec. 14, 1999, and Signe Gran 
[pseud.I, Mission, British Columbia, Dec. 14, 1999. Sec also Karin Edberg-Lee, Reco/lectirms ofSilver/1il/: 
An lnforma l His101y of w1 lmmigrallf Set1/e 111e111 (self-published book, no year), Eva St. Jean, Private Collec-
tion, and the Swedish Institute of Emigration, Vaxjo, Sweden. 
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War.76 Arne Lind, for instance, first immigrated to Two Harbors, Min-
nesota, in 1913, but re-migrated to Sweden in 1917 in order to avoid con-
scription when the United States declared war against Germany.77 After 
his return to Sweden, Ame trained as an electrician, but in 1921, when he 
was ordered to attend compulsory Swedish military training, he emi-
grated once more. This time he chose Canada, where he settled in J(jm-
berley, British Columbia. Arne followed the pattern of a dedicated 
socialist and respectable worker. He was a staunch pacifist and a member 
of the International Order of Good Templars, and other workers viewed 
him as a leader both in the workplace and in the community.78 Arne 
clearly valued his reputation as a "good worker," and saved letters of re-
commendation from Sweden and British Columbia that stressed his tech-
nical ability, reliability, sobriety and "good character."79 It is likely that 
his attention to duties grew from a defensive urge to prove he was not a 
"slacker" who avoided military duty either in the US or in Sweden for 
any other reason than sttictly ideological. 
Arne Lind 's uncompromising character brought him into conflict with 
his oldest son, Hans Lind, as Canada became involved in World War 
II. Although Hans was a member first of the Co-operative Common-
wealth Federation (CCF) and later the New Democratic Party (NDP), he 
lacked the hallmarks of the early sociali st generation, such as a commit-
ment to pacifism and abstinence from alcohol. Hans joined the Canadian 
Army in 1942, but only after a bitter argument with his father, who 
remained true to his pacifist beliefs.80 Thus, even when the second gener-
76. Barrell notes the importance of studying intergencrntional relations when discussing ethn ic conscious-
ness and class relations. Barrett , "i\mcricanization from the Bottom Up," IOOO. 
77. Interview with Hans Lind [pseud.], Victo ria, B.C .. 1999. Frnnklin D. Scott remarks that many Swe-
dish-American pacifi sts were deported from the United States when refusing to register for the draft. Sec 
Franklin 11. Sc:oll , '"L iterature in Periodicals of Protest of Swedish A merica," in t:ssays on th~ Scwuli fla vian-
North American Radical Press /880s-1930s, Dirk Hoerder, ed. (Bremen, Germany: Zcntraldruckcrc i der Uni-
versitilt Bremen, 1984), 15. 
78 . "Arne" saved his membership card from the Swedish lodge, "Friskt Mod" in Two Harbors, Mi nnesota, 
January 19 14, and from Lodge No. 26, the Scandinavian Grand Lodge of Minnesota, June 19 16. Due to Cana-
dian privacy laws, the name cannot be disclosed, but "Arne" coUected documents and letters throughout his 
life. "Arne Lind [pseud.] Manuscript Collection," Eva St. Jean, Pri vate Collection. See also Gunnel Hcdqvist 
[pseud.], interview with Eva St. Jean, 1999, and Hans Lind [pseud. i, interview with Eva St. Jean, 1999. 
79. Arne saved five lellcrs of recommendation from Skelleftea and Ulriksdal, Sweden, and one from the 
Consolidated Mining and Smeller Company in Kimberley, B.C. "Arne Lind [pseud.] Manuscript CoUection." 
80. Interview with Hans Lind [pseud.]. 
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ation Swedish-Canadians sympathized with the political left, they 
seemed much more eager to defend Canada when it once again went to 
war. 
Both conservative and socialist Swedish-Canadians reacted in a strik-
ingly different manner in the Second World War. Missing was the pro-
German sentiment and resentment against the host country that was so 
noticeable 1914- l 918. It is, however, difficult to measure patriotism by 
the degree of military service, since many Swedes worked in primary 
industries such as logging and mining that were declared essential ser-
vice. 81 Thus, for some, merely remaining on the job might have signified 
patriotism, although others might have found "essential services" a con-
venient way to escape the draft. Even if Scandinavians did not have their 
own regiment in this war, Hans Lind was by no means alone in volun-
teering for the Canadian services. Harald Wennergren joined the mer-
chant maiine,82 and interviewees from Silver Hill declare that most sons 
of Swedish immigrant families enlisted.83 Likewise, Otto Nordling, who 
emigrated from Lulea, Sweden, with his parents in 1914, joined the 
Canadian Army in 1940 and remained an army officer until his retire-
ment. Nordling was a staunch conservative who to his regret was unable 
to run for the Progressive Conservative Party in 1956 since it collided 
with his army commission.84 Clearly, the second time around the Swedish 
community showed no signs of siding with Germany: conservative 
Swedes supported Canada's participation in the war, and with some 
reservation, the same was true for Swedish and Scandinavian socialists. 
Scandinavian clubs were generally positive towards Canada's partici-
pation in the war despite an evident political tension between different 
Scandinavian groups. As earl y as September 1939, the Scandinavian 
8 1. Vancouver S1111, "B.C. Loggers to Get Military Exemptions," September 1, 1942. 
82. Although "Harold Wennergren" now lives in Silver Hill, as a child he emigrated from Pitea. Norr-
botten, to Campbell River, Vancouver Island, where he grew up. Harold's father was self-employed in Sweden 
and deeply regretted his decision to emigrate since he only found work as a logger in Canada. "Harold" has no 
memories of that his father resented his enlistment in the merchanl marines. Harold Wenncrgrcn [ pseud.J, 
interview with Eva St. Jean, 1999. 
83. Interview with Signe Gran fpseud.J and Emma Wennergren [pseud.]. Sec also Recol/ectio11s of Silver· 
hill, 22, 38, and especially 56. 
84. City of Vancouver Archives, Ouo Nordling Fonds, Add. MSS. 383. 
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Central Committee85 went on record to "stand behind Canada in fighting 
for democratic ideals, and ... [to] be ready when called."86 The Com-
mittee's polaiization between a radical and conservative faction, how-
ever, caused differences of opinion as to how the group should respond to 
political questions. In most issues, such as in the support of Victory 
Loans, minutes from the meetings are laconic and non-informative 
regarding possible ai·guments or comments from the delegates, but at 
other times conflicting opinions ai·e apparent. ln 1943, the Central Com-
mittee invited speakers such as Harold Pritchett and Nigel Morgan, both 
Communist labor organizers, while the motion to invite a speaker from 
the Board of Trade failed.87 The political tension came to a head when the 
Conunittee motioned to forward a resolution to the Committee of the 
Defense of Canada Regulation to legalize the Finnish Organizations of 
Canada Inc. and return aJJ of its properties. 88 The minutes abandoned 
their customary neutral tone, revealing that "a heated discussion took 
place" with the resulting compromise that the request would onl y refer to 
individuaJJy affiliated organizations of the Scandinavian Central Com-
mi ttee rather than to the umbrella organization.89 
T he matter did not end there. In November 1943, the Swedish Club90 
sent an open letter to aJJ individual Scandinavian organizations accusing 
the Scandinavian Central Committee of not fu lfi lling its stated purpose. 
The Swedish Club blamed this failure on a lack of "necessary initiative 
85. The Scandinavian Central Committee was in existence between 1936 and 1947. 11 consisted of four-
teen clubs and organisations from fi ve countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland. Olof Sea-
holm Colleclion- A 7B 113 [hereafter OSCJ, •'Records of Sca ndinavian Central Commince Meetings." Box 6, 
UBC-SC. 
86. Svenska Pre.ue11 , "Skandinaviska Centralkommillcn antager resolution om lojalilet," September 21 , 
1939. During the war years much of its activity involved collecting money fo r the war effort. Already in 1940 
it collected $ 1,000 for the Red Cross, and added ano ther $ 1,500 in 1942. Svemka Presse11 , November 26, 
1942. 
87. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Commiucc Meelings," Box 1, May 25, 1942. and January 11, 
1943. Carl Gravell and Matthew Lindfors signed the letter. An interview with "Sture Strang" reveals lhat al-
though Lindfors was respected for his community involvement, continuous tens ion ex isted between him and 
more radical Swedish immigrants. "Strang" believes that Lindfors was at least partly responsible for giving 
Swedish socialists a communistic label, something Strang cons iders highly exaggerated in view of their social 
democratic roots. Interview with Sture Su·ang Lpseud.J, Burnaby, December 1999. 
88. This motion originated in the Scandinavian Workers ' Club. See Minutes, July 4, 1943. Srn11di11avia11 
Workers' Club SA-144, Swenson Swedish Immigration Research Center, Augustana College, lll inois (here-
after SS/RC). 
89. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings," Box I, July 12, 1943. 
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on the part of the Committee," but also on "tendencies and actions by the 
Committee not generally approved" by its membership. The letter noted 
further that the Central Committee "had been used in certain political 
interests ... contrary to the best interests of the affiliated organisations ... 
[and] detrimental [to] Scandinavian co-operation since the membership 
... naturally embraces different political opinions."91 While the letter 
neglected to name the type of politics that it accused the Committee of 
having indulged in, the implications were clear that the Swedish Club 
resented being identified with left-wing politics. 
The matter received serious attention by the Central Committee. While 
the executive was disturbed by the possibility of a schism within the 
ranks, the letter from the Swedish Club also provoked hostility. The 
elected investigating committee called it "a piece of dirty work" that 
required immediate attention, but the chairman, Sid Seaholm - also the 
chairman of the Scandinavian Workers' Club - expressed a desire for 
continued relations with the Swedish Club and suggested that the opin-
ions in the letter were "based on doubtful foundation or facts ."92 Over the 
objections of the Swedish Club, the Committee decided to investigate 
and respond to the complaint. Shortly after a closed special meeting 
between the Committee and the Swedish Club, the Swedish Club moved 
that the Scandinavian Central Committee would "keep politics out of the 
meetings" and only discuss purely Scandinavian issues.93 When the 
motion was defeated, delegates from the Swedish Club walked out in 
protest, followed by the Icelandic society lsafold, the Danish Brother-
hood, and the Norwegian Male Chorus. A few weeks later, the Com-
mittee accepted the Swedish Club's letter of withdrawal from the Scandi-
navian Central Comrnittee.94 It is clear that a lthough all c lubs agreed on 
90. The Swedish Club (founded in 1931 by Consul Axel Stllhl) catered to Swedish profo ... ionals and husi-
ncss persons. lts main function was to organize banquets for vis iting Swedish dignitaries. See OSC, Box 6; 
and SP. "Svenska klubben fi rar 15-ars-fest," Pchruary 7, 1946. 
91. OSC, Box 1, "The Swedish Club 10 the Scandinavian Organizations," November 12, 1943. This con-
troversy clearly was nol new. In 1941 the Cen tral Committee noted that " fi ll is sometimes argued that cultural 
and benefit organisations such as ours, should not take part in issues that could be termed political." SP, "An 
Open Leiter," October 9. 194 1. 
92. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Comminee Meetings," Box 1, January 10, 1944. 
93. Note that the constitutions of the Central Commillee expressively state that it was "not a political or a 
religious organisation." OSC, Box I, "Constit ution for Joint Activities of the Scandinavian Organizations." 
94. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Commiuee Meeti ngs," Ilox l , March 13, 1944. 
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aiding the war effort, they were sharply divided on the question of the 
best way to accomplish this, and radical and conservative factions within 
the Committee were ideologically iITeconcilable. 
One of the clubs under the Central Committee was Skan.din.aviska 
Arbetarklubben. (SAK).95 It was labor oriented with an executive that 
dearly sympathized with the left, although several news clippings indi-
cate they felt a need to distance the dub from politics and union involve-
ment in order to attract and hold new members.96 Its mixed male and 
female membership in the late 1930s and early 1940s hovered around 
100 with 50 percent regarded as "active" and a maximum of 20 persons 
attending regular meetings .97 As with the umbrella organization, the min-
utes from the SAK point to some ambivalence about the Second World 
War. The minutes expressed the strongest protest against wars in general 
during the mid-1930s, but the target was fascism as much as war itself. 
"Health and economic betterment," it c1aimed, "is not enough:" 
What good wi ll it all do us; how can we enjoy our cultural activities, if we are not 
allowed to live in peace - if we have to fight and go to war? Anybody knows that war 
leaves little or no time for anything else; that war is something terrible, which hits the 
workers most of all. For that reason we are aga inst all wars for the oppression of any 
people, no matter what race or nationality, and against fascism, which has proven itself 
a ll too well to be an enemy of peace. The fascist governments are daily practicing vio-
lence, and preparing for more, in the form of war against the ir neighbors.98 
Considering this strong statement, the club minutes were surprisingly 
silent on the subject throughout the fall of 1939. In September 1939, a 
member spoke on "the critical times in E urope and the possible cancella-
tion of the coming Federal election" but the minutes remain neutral and 
also avoid the question of the Central Committee's advertised support of 
the Canadian war effort. Still , that November, the members approved to 
95. ll latcr went under the English translation, the Scand inavian Workers' Club. 
96. Two d ifferent newspaper cuttings commemorating its 5'1' anniversary stress the club's distancing from 
political activities. One suggests lhal SA K's earlier difficulti es in attracting members stemmed from "a lack in 
experience" that led !he club to "attempting" lo work according lo radical lines. " II became mixed up in union 
work and such thing. [However,] wmk in these types of clubs should be such that it attract interest from per-
sons of varied tradition" [trans.]. "Skandinaviska Arbelarklubbcn i Vancouver firar 5-Ars jubilcum," SAC, SA-
144, SSIRC. 
97. Minutes, throughout, SAC, SA- 144, SSIRC. 
98. "Whal is the Scandinavian Workers' Club? Whal is it do ing?" SAC, SA-144, SSfRC. 
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support the Canadian Defence League with a $3.00 donation in order to 
help those atTested for distributing anti-war pamphlets.99 As an indication 
of the club's vacillating responses, the next mention of the Canadian war 
effort was the election of two members to the Patriotic Debt for Victory 
Crusade.100 
While the majority of the club members seemed prepared to forget the 
war in favor of social activities, their energetic chairman, Sid Seaholm, 
occasionally managed to herd his flock further to the left on the political 
spectrum. Two weeks after the election, Seaholm convinced the members 
to withdraw the club's participation in the Victory Crusade.101 Although 
his time was mostly taken up with ananging and giving lectures on sub-
jects ranging from the history of the Swedish labor movement to Cana-
dian history, at times his political ideology sprang to the surface. In 
October 1941, he outlined "the works and aims" of the Scandinavian 
Anti-Fascist Committee and persuaded the club to endorse the work of 
the same. Nonetheless, he also supported the Central Committee's dona-
tion to the Red Cross and the Blood Donor drive, and a motion both to 
support the Memorial Fund and to purchase a war bond. 102 Apart from 
occasional twitches of socialist conscience, tickled into action by Sid 
Seaholm, the club itself remained happy to organize dances, theatrical 
events and public-speaking classes. 
While the minutes indicate that Seaholm was a driving force and more 
politically motivated than other members, there is little to suggest that he 
resented Canada's involvement with anything approaching the fervor felt 
by Swedish socialists during the First World War. In fact, neither Sea-
holm nor the SAK expressed a similar degree of pacifism as did leaders 
of the social-democratic Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) 
in British Columbia. According to J.L. Granatstein, CCF's leaders in BC 
were the only ones militant enough in Canada to argue against the war. 
As a result, the government sent spies to CCF meetings while Premier 
Pattullo issued a warning that in the future public pacifi st endorsements 
99. Minutes, November 26, 1939, SAC, SA- 144. SS IRC. 
100. Minutes, March 3, 1940, SAC, SA- 144, SS IRC. 
J 0 I. Minutes, March 17, 1940, SAC, SA- 144, SSIRC. 
102. Minutes, November 9 , 194 1, and October 18, 1942, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC. 
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would result in prosecution.103 SAK, dominated by a Swedish member-
ship in numbers and leadership and the most labor-oriented of all Scandi-
navian groups in Vancouver, was not willing to join ranks with CCF. 
Either truly torn in his position on the war question or just mindful of his 
vulnerable position as 'ethnic ', Seaholm refrained from voicing a con-
demnation of Canada's involvement in the Second World War. 
Likewise, Swedish-language newspapers refrained from criticizing 
Canada dming these troubled times. Rather than engaging in probing 
political commentaries, Svenska Pressen in British Columbia concen-
trated on defending Sweden, while simultaneously stressing the Swedish-
Canadian community's loyalty to Canada. Svenska Pressen was clearly 
on the Allied side from early on in the war, and there are no signs that it 
censored anti-B ritish letters or articles. Although notices about the war 
were rare at first, 104 by the end of 1940, Sweden and Swedish-Canadians 
declared themselves pro-England. By March 1940, the paper stated that 
Sweden was "definitely pro-English," and it predicted that Sweden 
would respond with armed resistance against any attack from Ger-
many. 105 Despite initial Axis victories, Svenska Pressen remained con-
vinced that England would eventually win the battle "for democracy in 
the world." 106 
Even though articles did not criticize Allied actions, they defended 
Sweden's right to neutrality. Many stressed similarities between Sweden 
and the United States and Canada, albeit few compared Swedish culture 
or politics with those of England.107 A prefen-ed tactic was to translate an 
English-language article that praised Sweden, as if the fact that it was 
originally published in a mainstream newspaper gave greater credence to 
the argument. In 1941, Svenska Press en translated an editorial column 
103. J.L. Granatstcin. Cwwcla'.1· War: Tile Politics ufthe Mackenzie Kiug Govem111e111, 1939-1945 (To-
ronto, 1975). 
104. Jn August of 1939 SP noted without comments that Sweden had prohibited what was considered an 
innammatory anti-Nazi fi lm made by Warner Bros. SP, "'Nazi Spy' forbjuden i Sverige," August 24, 1939. 
105. SP, "Sweden's Side of the Story," March 2 1. 1940. See also SP, "Sweden has helped and is now 
helping her stricken neighbours," February 6, 194 1. 
106. SP, "Sverigenytt i amerikansk press," June 27, 1940. 
107. For instance, Svenska Presse11 published for several weeks instalments of a longer comparative art-
icle between Canada and Scandinavia written by Paul Mailes, a "well-known European correspondent" who 
was the Canadian reporter for the Swedish newspaper Socio/ De111okrate11 in 1942. Mailes. See SP, "Scandi-
navia and the War: Cam1das fsicj Stake in ~orthern Europe," April 16, 1942, and February to March 1943. 
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from the Washington Times Herald that suggested that the Allies' criti-
cism of Sweden was undeserved, and favorably compared the Swedish 
humanitarian aid efforts with those of Britain and the United States. 108 Tn 
other instances, Al var Anderson first noted several geographical similari-
ties between Canada and Sweden before he paid tribute to Swedes , who 
as "good Canadians ... have joined the Canadian Armed Forces and gone 
out to help defeat Hitlerism."109 In a later article, Anderson defended 
Sweden's political position, noting that "many complicated factors" were 
behind the Swedish policy of neutrality but that sympathy for Germany 
was not a consideration. On the contrary, he noted that "Nazi leaders are 
constantly showing how thoroughly annoyed they are with the only 
country in the north which could not be forced into becoming a satellite 
of the 'New Order."'110 
Svenska Pressen and Swedes in North America responded with partic-
ular alertness when Swedish neutrality was under attack or when Sweden 
was accused of pro-German actions. 111 When the Globe in Toronto criti-
cized Sweden's neutrality policy, the respondent, Albin Widen, 112 sug-
gested that self-serving business objectives in Canada motivated the cri-
tique. 113 The Norwegian conespondent for a Minneapolis newspaper, 
who alleged that Sweden had helped Germany's war effort more than any 
other collaborator, also provoked a detailed response. After first having 
108. SP, "Finland kiimpar nu mot hunger och kold," January 23, 1941. Other Ameiican press releases that 
favoured Sweden can be found in Svenska Presse11, "The Case of Sweden," July 15, 1943, and "Sveriges stall-
ning i Amerika bar forbattras," February JO, J 944. 
109. "Sweden - Surrounded, but Still lndependcnl," Sve11ska Presse11. November 25, J 943. The paper 
stressed any connection between Sweden and Canada, however slim. For other examples, sec "Swedish Paper 
Hails Canada as Great Power of the Future," Scptcmhcr 9, 1943; "Scandinavia and the War," February 11, 
1943; "Svenskarna aro vara vanner," Svenska Presse11, October 5, 1944; "Canadensiska flygare relatera erfa-
renheter i Sverige," January 4, 1945; and "Sweden Pays Tribute to Canadians," January 11, 1945. 
I lO. Svenska Presse11, December 30, I \M3. See nlso Signe Toksvig's series uf articles, "How Neutral is 
Sweden?" Apiil I, 8, 15, 22, 25 and 29, 1943; and Albin Widen, "Har Sverige slagit in pii en ny kurs?" April 
29, J 943. 
11 l. Whenever possible, the paper emphasised Germany's irritation with Sweden 's foreign policy. For 
example, see SP, "Tysk k:ritik for svensk film val," October 23, 1941 ; or "Swedes United in Determination to 
Defend Their Land," December 15, 194 1. 
112. Albin Widen wrote for the Swedish Information Bureau in Minneapolis, but his column appeared 
regularly in SP. In an earlier column, Widen explained that his refusal to write about Norway and Norwegians 
was because of their persistent vilification of Sweden that Swedes - out of sympathy with Norway's cause -
found impossible to counter effectively. See SP, "Vad kan Sverige giira for nornniinnen?" July 15, 1943. 
113. SP, "Finns det nagon ideologisk neutralitct?" October 12, 1944. 
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attested to Sweden's friendship with Norway, Widen compared Sweden 
to Norway and the United States before these nations were forced into the 
war: "Sweden [was] neutral because it [had] not been attacked" . More-
over, Widen pointed out that if Sweden's strict neutrality policy had not 
prevented France and Britain from sending troops when the Soviets 
attacked Finland in 1939, it might have moved the Soviet Union from a 
passive to an active alliance with Germany. Thus, "Sweden 's neutrality 
saved both England and democracy."114 These explanations insisted that 
Sweden was on the side of the Allies despite its neutrality. 
There are, however, indications that despite the press and Swedish 
organizations, most Swedes did not consider the war their concern. In 
1941 , the Scandinavian Central Committee regretted that some free-
standing Scandinavian organizations had failed to respond to "the life 
and death issue that our country is today helping to decide." 115 Similarly, 
Matthew Lindfors noted that individual Scandinavian donations to the 
Canadian Red Cross were far from satisfactory. He reminded readers that 
their national honor was at stake and urged them to protect their reputa-
tion as a loyal ethnic group. 116 Ads for Victory Loans emphasized Sweden 
rather than leaning on Canadian nationalism, maintaining that by lending 
financial support to Canada, Swedish-Canadians also helped their moth-
erland. One ad beseeched Swedes to recognize that "deep inside their 
hearts" they knew that an Allied victory was the only thing that could 
bring the Swedish economy back on its feet. 117 Despite its Swedish focus, 
the campaign had limited success, and in 1943, the Chairman of the Vi c-
tory Loans Committee complained that Scandinavians did not buy their 
share, which caused the Scandinavian Central Committee to "advertise 
more forcefull y both in the language press as well as in the daily 
press." 118 Thus, it is possible that there was a di screpancy between 
11 4. SP, "Vilkcn sida har haft sltirs ta nyuan av Sverigcs neutralilclspolitik?" October 7. 1943 [trans.]. This 
was a common argument in the defence of Swedish neutrali1y. See SP, "The Swedes are out to get the busi-
ness," November 8, 1945. 
I 15. Svenska Pres.mi, "An Open Letter." Oc1ober 9, 194 I. 
I 16. SP, "Skandinavernas kampanj f<ir Roda Korsct," Augus1 22, 1940. 
I 17. SP, "Svenskar i Canada," June 5, 1941 [trnns.]. In other edilorials, Lindfors voiced 1he hope thal 
Swedes in Canada would be "as loyal to this cause [Victory Bonds] as any na1ional group." SP, "Let us do our 
part," February 6, 194 1; and "'Du Gamla, Du Fria,' or ·0eu1schland Uber Alles"!" June 12, 1941. 
I I 8. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings," Box 6, April 26, 1943, and May 10, 
1943. 
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Swedish club activities and the general Swedish immigrant community, 
in that the clubs felt a stronger need to prove their loyalty to Canada. 
When Matthew Lindfors created a separate English-language news-
paper in 1944, the tone in the Victory Bond advertisement was quite dif-
ferent. It anticipated that its English-language readers were more loyal to 
Canada than to Sweden or any other Scandinavian country. One ad spoke 
to "Canadians of Scandinavian origin," rather than to "Swedes in 
Canada" and reminded the reader of their many "husbands or sons [who 
were] discharging their own duty on the battlefield." 11 9 Hence, Lindfors 
anticipated that readers of the English-language Scandinavian Post were 
second or third generation Canadians who could be expected to be more 
loyal to Canada than readers of the Swedish-language Svenska Pressen. 
Swedes, therefore, began to clamor more openly for Canadian rather 
than Swedish nationalism. Somewhat misguidedly, the Swedish-born 
Liberal MP, Olof Hanson, maintained that the United States had no 
hyphenated citizens. He suggested that Swedes and other immigrants in 
Canada do the same, viewing themselves as foremost Canadians in order 
to create a united Canada. 120 Already in 1939, Swedes in British Co-
lumbia debated whether a Swedish culture in Canada was desirable. 
Swedish organizations increasingly switched to English in order to attract 
members, and clubs began to commence meetings by singing "O 
Canada" rather than "Du Gamla Du Fria." 12 1 According to "Ex-kulturell," 
Swedish language, art and literature were irrelevant in an English-lan-
guage country where artists such as Anders Zorn and Bruno Li ljefors 
were unknown.122 The letter provoked discussions both for and against a 
Swedish culture. In his editorial comment, Matthew Lindfors labelled 
'Ex-kulturell' "un-Swedish," but the reader "Svensk Canadian" agreed 
with 'Ex-kulturell', and argued for a pragmatic approach to immigration 
that involved a joint effort with other ethnic groups to improve conditions 
for workers. 123 The letter also provoked a discussion in the Scandinavian 
119. Srn11di11a11ia11 Post, "A Privilege and a Duty," April 15, 1944. 
120. Scaudi11a11iau Post, "Olof Hanson Voices Pica for United Canada," May 11 , 1944. 
121. As did many other clubs around this time, the Scandinavian Workers' Club changed its official lan-
guage from Swedish to English in January 1940. SP, "Skand. Arbctarklubbe n hilll silt arsmote," J anuary 11 , 
1940; and SP, "Po11 Alberni Scandinavians hold banq uet," March 1, 1945 . 
122. S P, "Ska kultur scrvcras varm e llcr kall?" October 26, 1939. 
123. SP, " Fran Iasekretsen: Red. M. M . Lindfors," November 2, 1939. See also, "Du Omnia, Du Fria ... ", 
November 9 , 1939. S P, " Ar Skandinavisk Nati ona lism i Canada beriilli gad?" November 9. 1939. 
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Workers' Club.124 Its leader Sid Seaholm argued against the need for a 
Swedish culture, while Matthew Lindfors defended Swedish-Canadian 
culture. Thus, Lindfors, who represented the conservative side of the 
Swedish community, saw the need to maintain a Swedish culture in 
Canada, while left-wing elements suggested a more definite form of 
assimilation. Certainly, the ethnocultural class formation that was evident 
in the First World War was missing in these discussions. 
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly how the change in mood occurred, but 
the Swedes seem to have adjusted to Canada with a minimum transition 
period. In 1935, a Scandinavian communist organization, the Scandina-
vian Workers Club in Edmonton, called for a conference including all 
Scandinavian clubs in Alberta to discuss a possible upcoming war in 
Europe. With a mocking reference to Ludvig Holberg's comedy The 
Political Thinker, the Swedi sh club Nordstjarnan declined to participate 
in the meeting, making it clear that it wished to distance itself from the 
Workers Club's left-wing politics.125 Nevertheless, although the letters 
indicate a concern by the Scandinavian communists - likely influenced 
by Comintern policies - the hostility towards Canada and Britain that 
was obvious in 1914-1918 is missing also from this correspondence. Lars 
Ljungmark notes a similar trend in Winnipeg. In the 1930s, SCT still 
reacted against "the British arrogance" and several articles decried the 
alleged widespread intolerance and frequent deportation of unemployed 
immigrants. 126 Ljungmark, however, suggests that these ill feelings were 
missing from the rhetoric when war broke out again. He claims that the 
most remarkable difference is the lack of public suspicion toward 
Swedish immigrants and, when 1939 came along, the loyalty the Swedish 
community showed for the Canadian war effort. Ljungmark suggests that 
a growing Canadian nationalism put the Swedish critique of Britain more 
124. Minutes. Octobcr29, 1939, SAC, SA- 144, SSTRC. 
125. "No11/stjtima11, 1929- 1979," manuscript co llection he ld by Rune Anderson, Edmonton, Alberta. I am 
indebted to Carina Ronn4vist for sharing these documents. This reference to a seventeenth-century Danish 
playwright sheds light on the literacy among Scandinavian groups, and the outraged response from the Wor-
kers Club indicates the sting of political sarcasm. While the letter only refers to the play by its tit le, one of the 
last stan1.as in The Political Thinker reads: "Each working ma n should recognize/From watching this diver-
sionffhough he may leaders cri ticize/He knows not how to govern." See Ludvig Holberg, .leppe of rlie hill 
and other comedies, trans. Gerald S. Argetsinger and Sven H. Rossel (Southern fll inois University Press, 
1990), 53. 
126. See for example, SGT, August 24. I 933, and May I 3, I 937 . 
, 
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in step with native-born Canadians, who advocated a retreat from British 
involvement in Canadian affairs. This in turn allowed Swedish-Cana-
dians to blend Swedish with Canadian nationalism. 127 
This alone, however, does not fully explain the dramatic switch, and a 
number of other factors, such as time of arrival and remigration seem to 
have also had an impact. The Swedish population in Canada grew dra-
matically between 1901 and 19 11 , and thus most of the complainants in 
SCT were fairly new arrivals who had not yet had time to set down roots 
in Canada. 128 In British Columbia, on the other hand, Swedish immigra-
tion peaked in the 1920s, with waves arriving in 1923 and 1928. Many 
Swedes had only lived in British Columbia for little over a decade when 
the war broke out, but the brief period of adjustment is not sufficient to 
allow for the differences in loyalties. Remigration from Canada to 
Sweden increased dramatically during the 1930s, at the same time that 
immigration from Sweden came to a grinding halt. 129 This suggests that 
many of the immigrants who found it difficult to adjust to the new 
country had time to return home, and no newcomers took their place. 
Swedish immigrants who remained in British Columbia were those who, 
for various reasons, were able to compete in a difficult job market. 
The community was divided during both wars, but the dominant trend 
from the one period differed from that manifested in the other. Some 
Swedes participated in the Scandinavian Overseas Battalion in the First 
World War, but passive resistance and even vigorous rejection of Britain 
and Canada were more conspicuous inclinations. Conversely, during the 
Second World War, there were Swedes who believed that the war was not 
their concern, while the official voices of their community, the press and 
the Scandinavian organizations spoke fervently for the war effort. By the 
127. Lars Ljungmark, Sve11skam a i Wi1111ipeg: porte11 till priirie 11 1872-1940 (Vttxj1i: Emigrantsinstitulets 
viinncr, 1994), 205-207. 
128. The Swedish-born population in Canada grew from 3,965 in 1900 to 12,940 in 1910. By 192 1, 
27,700 Swedish-born men and women had made Canada their home. Census of Canada, 192 1, Populatirn1, 
Table 7, "Numerical distribution of the immigrant population by birthplace, sex and year of arrival in Canada, 
by provinces." 
129. The Swedish-born population in British Columbia grew from 5,735 in 1921 to 9 ,333 in 193 1; how-
ever, it dove to 7, 729 persons in 194 1. Sec Census of Canada, 1921, Vol 2, Table 52; Census of Canada, 1931 , 
Vol 2, Table 46; and Census of Canada, l 941, Vol. 2, Table 43. For information on rernigration lo Sweden, see 
liisto risk S wtestik for Sverige, Vol. I , "Ilefolkningen 1720-1950, Tab. B 30 (Stockholm: Statistiska Central-
byran, 1955). 
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1940s, Swedish-Canadians had moved from an ethnic consciousness 
where a "'we' versus 'them ' mentality" set them apart from other ethnic 
groups in Canada, to the less vibrant position of ethnic awareness where 
participation in ethnic organizations did not exclude a sense of Canadian 
identity. Likewise, the ethnic consciousness of the 19 lOs was character-
ized by a strong Swedish nationalism while in the 1940s, affinity for 
Sweden did not supersede Canadian nationalistic feelings.130 
Moreover, in the 191 Os, Swedes in Canada felt betrayed by a society 
that invited them as "preferred immigrants" while still treating them in a 
discriminatory manner. John Herd Thompson maintains that English-
Canadian hostility against foreigners had always been present, but that it 
escalated in 1917 and 1918. 131 That in all probability neither the Cana-
dian government nor the public singled out Swedes in particular is not of 
utmost importance in this discussion. Anglo-Canadians disdained immi-
grants in general, but for various reasons Swedes found this xenophobia 
difficult to accept, and it is their antagonistic response to the discrimina-
tory Canadian society that is significant. In the late 1910s, Swedish-
Canadian socialists often responded by mixing their pacifist ideology 
with an anti-British and anti-Canadian sentiment that expressed itself 
through support of Germany. It is revealing that this support was rarely 
articulated with political arguments relating to the war; rather, these 
critics seemed to have identified with Germany's position as an 
underdog. This socialistic rhetoric thus differed from that expressed by 
moderate and radical socialists in Canada and Sweden. 132 
Swedes did not experience the same degree of alienation in Canada in 
the 1940s. Even in Briti sh Columbia where Swedish immigration was 
fairly recent with one of its greatest peaks in 1928, Swedes seemed more 
willing to identify with the host country and its British heritage. Conse-
quently, time of arrival alone is not a suffici ent explanation for the dimin-
ished ethnic consciousness; a growing flexibility among Anglo-Cana-
130. For a good account of "complementary rather than competing" Swedish and Canadian national ism as 
expressed by Swedes in Alberta, see Carina Rtinnqvist, "Scat1ered Swedes and Single Sct1 lers. On Ethnic 
Identity Rellcctcd in Nationalistic Sentiments, Gender and Class in 20'h Century Canada," in S1vedis/111ess 
Reconsidered. Three Centuries of Swedislr-A111erico11 lde11tities, Daniel Lindmark. ed. (Umca, 2000). 
13 1. 111ompson, "/11e Harvests of \Vnr, 85-87. 
132. Mc Kay and Lewins maintain that ethnically conscious groups "are most likely to be involved in con-
flict situations" (emphasis McKay and Lc wins), 424. 
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dians also allowed Swedish immigrants to explore their dual loyalties. 
Still, even if Swedish-Canadians were well integrated in Canadian so-
ciety during the Second World War, their many clubs and organizations 
and the survival of the Swedish-language newspaper, Svenska Pressen, 
pointed to a strong ethnic awareness and a lingering affection for their 
native land. During the Second World War, Swedes in Vancouver were 
joined by ethnicity and divided by class. The aggressive defiance of the 
First World War that caused them to lash out against Canada had settled 
into a defensive nationalism that incorporated both the old and the new 
homeland. 
